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bers' orthodoxy or deviance. The members ' "mental h ealth" is medicalized and
made the sole prerogative of the psychiatric profession. The psychiatrist rather
than the priest, rabbi, or minister determines acceptab le behavior, exorcises the
deviant, and counse ls the legislator on th e formulation of laws aimed at maintaining the status quo.
The media, with its own stake in selling papers and promoting its TV ratings , is
tempted to manipulate the news to its own purposes. Cults make good copy and
create interest, so they are exploited by the media beyo nd their own importance
and influence. What is of importance is the effect that this kind of reporting has
on popular sentiments and the pension of legislators to respond to these popular
hysterics. The real question is whether the current cult ph enomenon in our prese nt
society is of such a magnitude or danger that it warrants the inauguration of
legislation which could seriously threaten the religious freedom which is a fundamental right guaranteed by th e Constitution. The numbers involved and the
results of recent government investigations seem to indicate that we do not need
to institute another Inquisition to insure th e maintenance of our current secularistic status quo.
Understanding conversion as a normal part of the process of human development is an important insight gleaned from present theological reflection. When
viewed in the context of th e conversion of certain historical figures, the conversions of many of our present-day idealistic youths do not appear as spectacular
and unusual as we are led to be lieve. The fact that some young people today have
turned from common ly accepted standards in search of a fuller mea ning in their
lives through new forms of religious expression may cause many to feel uncomfortaple at their own unexamined life, but this discomfort should not stampede
our society into legislating away the very religious freedom which our people
enjoy. This book has done well in raising and clarifying the issues surrounding
religious cults. With its insights , perhaps the efforts to "save" the few will not
result in the destruction of the religious freedoms of the many. The latter loss
would be far greater than the first.
- Joseph H. Determan, O .P.
Mental Health Chaplain Supervisor
St. Elizabeth Hospital, Washington, D.C.

Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law
by Anthony Battaglia
Seabury, New York, 1981, 150 pages, $14.95.
Battaglia presents h ere a modifi ed version of the natural law theory, by which
he tries to steer a middle course between absolutism (immutable precepts) an d
compl ete relativism (no grounding of precepts in reality). His version is supposed
to be faith ful to the central insights of St. Thomas Aquinas - whom he calls the
greatest of the natural law theorists (p. 4) - while d eve loping his thought with an
eye to modern problems, especially that of "historicity."
Battaglia argues that , for Aquinas, our knowledge not only of God, but also of
creatures, can be only analogical , no t univocal. He then interpre ts "analogica l
knowledge" to m ean partially fa lse, " reform ul a ble ," and uncertain. According to
Battaglia, Aquinas h eld that we know things not as they really are but only in
te rms of our knowing power (p. 41); we know not th e essences of things but only
their appearances (p. 141).
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The reason for Aquinas's position is supposed to be that "the truth of things'"
consists in their conformity to God's mind, but since we do not know God's
mind, we cannot know the truth of things (p. 32). We are told that Aquinas is
assured that our knowledge is in some sense true of things only by a theological
belief that our first principles are a sharing in the divine light (p. 41).
Aquinas allegedly applies this general skepticism on human knowledge to the
particular question of our knowle dge of the human good or of natural law. So
Aquinas believes that the first principles of morality provide an assurance of some
type of conformity to the divine will (pp. 46, 47). But these principles, Battaglia
argues, are only tautologies - "Good is to be done , evil avoided," "Unjust killing
is evil," as if to say, "Do not do what is immoral." Sinc e only these first principles
are immutable, the result is that every moral precept stated non-tautologically is
culturally conditioned and changeable (p. 56).
The moral criterion Battaglia retrieves from Aquinas is explained in the last
part of the book. On the one hand , what is reasonable is "a function of whatever
community one seems to belong to " (p. 104). But on the other hand , our judgments about the human good are testable. If our moral system works, then that is
an indication of its adequacy (at least partial) to human nature (p. 129).
On this view, changes in morality are analogous to developments in empirical
sc ience (at least on the interpretation of relativist philosophers of science, such as
T. S. Kuhn, m entioned by Battaglia). Both develop according to a hypothetical
m e thod; both are ever changing, so metimes gradually, sometimes abruptly . As
empirical science works only with a paradigm of reality, which is not absolutely
true but accepted mere ly as a basis for work (on the conceptual relativists ' interpretation), so also does morality. "It is from the paradigm of what a human being
is that we generate a notion of what a human being ought to be if h e is to be
happy, or rather these are already outlined for us in the culture" (p. 134). Thus
Battaglia's middle course.
Th e book abounds in scholarly ineptitudes. For example, to support his reading of Aquinas on hum an knowledge, Battaglia quotes Aquinas to the effect that
we know things "not by their essence but by their similitudes" (Battaglia's translation of a phrase from the Summa Theologiae, p art I , question 87, article 1).
Battaglia interprets this to mean that for Aquinas we know only the appearances
of things (pp. 38, 46). Consulting the text one finds that a) Aquin as is there
talking about angels, not men , and b) Battaglia has mistranslated and the phrase
should read, "The angel cannot know all things through its own essence, but it
knows things oth er t h a n itself through their similitudes." For Aquinas, to know
by means of a similitude is not the sa me as to know merely a similitude; both
angels and men know things themselves but by means of similitudes.
Again, on p. 50, Battaglia cites Germain Grisez's article on Aquinas's first
principle of practic a l reason, to support the argument that Aquinas 's position on
knowle dge differs fro m Kant's only in that Aquinas h as a theological assurance of
the "truth " of first principles. In that article, however, Grisez.says the opposite of
what is claimed. One wonders whether Battaglia read the article.
R egarding his general interpretation of Aquinas, only three points will be mentioned. Battaglia does claim that his reading of Aquinas "is ground ed in his texts
and can certainly be read as a valid understanding of his thinking" (p. 4).
First, on Aquinas 's theory, "analogical" has nothing to do with " partially
false" or "uncertain" or "changeable." The proposition, God exists, is known
analogically; it is n eith er partially false, somewhat uncertain, nor subject to
change. Moreover, it is not the case that for Aquinas all our knowledge of creatures (specifically, of the human good) is analogical, or that we must know God's
mind to know truth (the "truth of things" as their conformity to God's mind is a
secondary and derive d sense of the word "truth").
Secondly , Battaglia attribute s to Aquinas th e argument that since the human
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good, or happiness, is the criterion of morality, and since God is the happiness of
human beings and we do not apprehend God, it follows that we have no firm
grasp of a criterion of morality (pp. 58-61). Soon after, Aquinas 's "skepticism" is
compared with that of Hume (p. 118). But for Aquinas, when a man acts in
conformity with right reason (reason made right by a respect for the basic human
goods, the objects of man's natural inclinations), then his action is in fact ordered
to the ultimate end (by being open to it, at least) , though he may not be conscious of tha t order.
Thirdly, in the second part of his Summa Theologiae Aquinas classifies more
than 40 types of acts as always morally evil or sinful, including such acts as killing
the innocent, suicide, lying , adultery, rape, incest, etc. It is difficult to believe that
this same thinker held that the only immutable precepts were tautological, not to
mention th e problem of why he might think a set of tautologies is so important.
In fact, for Aquinas , the primary, immutable precepts of the natural law are not
tautological. These precepts oblige that man pursue and avoid acting against (without exception) specific, real human goods, such as life, truth, the procreative
good, etc.
Regarding Battaglia's argument itself, apart from historical accuracy, three
points will be made. First, all of the problems that plagued the old (and innacurate)
interpretation of Aquinas's moral criterion as "human nature adequately considered," remain problems for this theory. Whether the nature be "adequately
considered" or something of which we have merely a "paradigm ," there remains
the logical problem of how one passes from "man's nature is x" to "man ought to
do y." The only difference is that Battaglia makes the first premise uncertain; the
logical sequence he leaves unclarified. (Battaglia adverts to Aquinas's distinction
between practical truth and speculative truth, but reduces practical truth to truth
about the human good; in Aquinas's view the latter is still speculative. The distinction lies elsewhere.)
Secondly, Battaglia never, in fact, even tries to prove that there are no
immutable precepts. He does try to show that this is Aquinas's position. But
obviously Battaglia would not accept one of the premises in what is supposed to
be Aquinas's argument, nam ely that truth consists solely in a thing 's conformity
to God's mind (which is not Aquinas's position anyway). Hence the relativist part
of his thesis rests solely upon a doubly bad argument from authority .
Thirdly, the conclusion suffers from internal difficulties. The basic argument is
that historical relativity is compatible with moral judgments being based in human
nature, in that moral systems are paradigms which are testable by their consequences: "only paradigms which are adequate to human nature will work" (p.
127). Th e difficulty is that what constitutes "working," on the supposition of
historical relativity, will itself have to be judged by a second uncertain paradigm.
Hence the theory either b egs the question or amounts to embracing whatever the
going ideology happens to be.
This view of morality can scarcely be called a "natural law theory," revised or
not. If " natural law" m eans anything, it means what we know, what is "written in
our h earts," what even pagans know, not hypothesize or construct "paradigms"
about. Furthermore (as briefly indicated above) , Battaglia 's theory really has
nothing to do ,with Aquinas's - even though it might have occurred to Battaglia
while perusing the Summa Theologiae. It seems to me that the only reason Battaglia thinks otherwise on these points is in order to construct an ad populum
argument aimed at Catholic audiences.
In short , the arguments are inept , the scholarship is incompetent. I do not
recommend the book.
- Patrick Lee
Center for Thomistic Studies
University of St. Thomas , Houston
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